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Abstract 
An overview of previous evidence about relationship banking to SMEs shows that multiple 
banking relationships prevail even at small firms, but there is hardly evidence on the number 
of banking relationships held by micro firms. To close this gap, we use data from a survey 
conducted among professionals in Germany in 2002. Being self-employed persons acting in 
the services sector, professionals are mostly informationally opaque micro firms. To explain 
the number of their banking relationships, we investigate characteristics of the firm and its 
loan demand, characteristics of the housebank and its relationship to the borrower, and 
variables of bank market structure and regulation. Consistent with the theory of asymmetric 
information, we find that these firms hold a small number of bank relationships, which 
increases in firm size and age. An increase in the duration or importance of the housebank 
relationship does not induce multiple banking relationships as predicted by the hold-up 
theory. Professionals rather tend to hold multiple banking relationships to increase their credit 
availability and finance larger loans. The type of the housebank and local banking market 
concentration do not seem to matter. All in all, the results indicate that multiple bank 
relationships help to overcome credit rationing. 
 
JEL Code: G21, G32 
                                                 
*   We are grateful to an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions and comments on an earlier version. 1. Introduction 
The number of bank relationships held by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is one 
of the key variables in the literature on relationship lending.
1 A low number of lending banks 
is usually considered an indicator of a close bank-customer relationship, which helps to 
overcome credit rationing due to asymmetric information. The information-based theory of 
financial intermediation predicts that an information-opaque small or young firm borrows 
from only one to few banks. This ‘one-to-few’ hypothesis has been confirmed for SME loans 
in several countries, but not for the majority of countries in cross-section studies 
(Ongena/Smith, 2000b, Qian/Strahan 2005). The evidence of a large cross-country variation 
in the number of bank relationships with multiple banking relationships prevailing even at 
small firms has induced research on the determinants of this variable. While in empirical 
studies on relationship lending the number of bank relationships has been often treated as an 
exogenous variable, recent research focuses on explaining this number or the probability of 
multiple banking relationships.
2 The number of lending relationships may not only be an 
indicator of the incidence of a housebank relationship (Elsas, 2005), but also of borrower 
quality and size (Machauer/Weber, 2000). Moreover, it may be affected by the stability of the 
banking sector, with a higher incidence of multiple banking relationships in more fragile 
environments (Detragiache et al., 2000). 
 
So far, the empirical studies on relationship lending refer to small and medium-sized firms, 
neglecting micro firms. According to the European Union, the category of micro, small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is made up of enterprises which employ fewer than 250 
persons and which have an annual turnover not exceeding EUR 50 million, and/or an annual 
balance sheet total not exceeding EUR 43 million. Within this category, a microenterprise,  
respectively small enterprise is defined as an enterprise which employs fewer than 10 persons, 
respectively 50 persons and whose annual turnover and/or annual balance sheet total does not 
exceed EUR 2 million, respectively EUR 10 million (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2003, p. 39). The present paper focuses on professionals, which fall mostly into 
the category of microenterprises. They differ from other enterprises by being self-employed 
persons acting mainly in the services sector. Under the regulatory environment given in 
                                                 
1   For surveys see Boot (2000), Ongena/Smith (2000a) and Elyasiani/Goldberg (2004). 
2    See Ongena/Smith (2000b), Guiso/Minetti (2004), Cosci/Meliciani (2002), Detragiache et al. (2000), 
Machauer/Weber (2000), Harhoff/Körting (1998b), Ziane (2003), Degryse/Ongena (2001) Berger et al. (2001), 
Berger et al. (2005), Yu/Hsieh (2003), Fok et al. (2004), Ogawa et al. (2005). 
  2   Germany, they have to prove their professional qualification, but are not obliged to register 
their business. Our motive for investigating the number of bank relationships of professionals 
is both to close a gap in the empirical literature, and to test the theory of asymmetric 
information: since professionals are microenterprises with mostly intangible assets in the 
services sector, we expect that they are especially prone to adverse selection and moral hazard 
and hence to credit rationing. Beyond our academic interest, it may be valuable for banks to 
understand the demand of professionals for bank relationships. Professionals represent a 
customer segment in the profitable retail banking business, whose importance is growing with 
the expansion of the services sector.  
 
We use data from a survey conducted among professionals in Germany in 2002 to explain the 
number of bank relationships held by these firms. As possible determinants we investigate 
characteristics of the firm and its loan demand, characteristics of the housebank and its 
relationship to the borrower, and variables of bank market structure and regulation. Consistent 
with previous studies for small and medium-sized firms, we find that the number of bank 
relationships increases with firm size and age. Our results do not support the hypothesis that 
firms develop multiple banking relationships to reduce hold-up costs. Rather they indicate 
that multiple banking relationships serve to increase credit availability and finance larger 
loans. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the 
theoretical and empirical literature and presents the hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 
describes the data used and the measurements of the variables. The econometric results are 
presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
  3   2. Theory and Empirical Evidence on the Number of Bank Relationships 
2.1 Theory and Hypotheses 
Theoretical explanations of the optimal number of bank relationships differ with respect to the 
motives for multiple banking relationships both on the side of the borrowing firms and the 
banks.
3 They yield hypotheses about the influence of characteristics of the firm and its loans, 
of the bank-borrower relationship and of the bank and the banking market on the number of 
bank relationships.  
 
A first class of arguments is based on cost minimization within the theory of asymmetric 
information. According to Diamond’s delegated monitoring model, a single bank relationship 
is most efficient when a firm borrows once, because it minimizes monitoring costs (Diamond, 
1984). Especially risky, informationally opaque firms benefit from an exclusive banking 
relationship, because credit availability is improved through the housebank’s
4 accumulation of 
information about borrower quality (Petersen/Rajan, 1995). In the case of  repeated lending by 
the same bank, the terms of lending may improve after a successful completion of the project 
(Boot/Thakor, 1994). Moreover, a housebank relationship provides a kind of liquidity 
insurance, which eases financing constraints of SMEs. In a single banking relationship, there 
are no problems of free riding that are likely to impede an efficient renegotiation in the case of 
multiple lenders. The borrower is insured against the risk that in the case of financial distress 
distributional conflicts between multiple lenders cause a premature liquidation of the firm 
(Hellwig, 1991, p.54; Koziol, 2005).
5 On the other hand, a lending relationship to a single 
bank is likely to ease the financing of inefficient projects due to a soft budget constraint 
(Dewatripont/Maskin, 1995) or may induce the manager to strategically default the project 
(Bolton/Scharfstein 1996). The resulting agency costs could be reduced by coordinating with 
multiple lenders. Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) determine the optimal number of lenders that 
balances the benefits of deterring strategic defaults against the costs of realizing a low 
liquidation value in a liquidity default. They predict that a larger number of banking 
                                                 
3   For a recent overview see Ogawa et al. (2005). 
4   We use ‚housebank’ and ‚relationship bank’ as synonymous terms. A housebank is usually defined as the 
major lender of a firm and does not preclude that the firm holds also other bank relationships. For German 
universal banks the incidence of a housebank status has been shown to be positively related to the bank’s share 
of borrower debt financing, but negatively related to the firm’s number of bank relationships (Elsas, 2005). 
5    For empirical evidence see Brunner und Krahnen (2002), who show that the success probability of a 
workout of financially distressed firms depends negatively on the number of lending banks. Gilson et al. (1990) 
and Petersen/Rajan (1994) find that a larger number of creditors worsens the terms of credit and increases the 
cost of financial distress to small firms. 
  4   relationships signals higher borrower quality. The reverse prediction follows from Bannier 
(2005) and Carletti (2004). Bannier (2005) shows that a heterogeneous multiple bank 
relationship, where a housebank is combined with several arm’s length lenders, is 
advantageous for financially distressed borrowers. It combines the advantage of a housebank 
to reduce the likelihood of an inefficient liquidation with the improvement of credit 
availability by arm’s length lenders. Carletti (2004) analyzes how banks’ monitoring 
incentives change with the number of banking relationships and how this affects firms’ 
optimal borrowing choice. She shows that the attractiveness of two-bank lending is increasing 
in the cost of monitoring, the firm’s private benefit and expected profitability.  
 
Another aspect of cost minimization concerns the cost of information disclosure. 
Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995) suggest that firms with valuable proprietary information 
prefer fewer creditors to prevent information leakage. Yosha (1995) shows that a highly 
innovative, high quality firm that invests to a large extent in R&D will not be willing to give 
all the information to multiple banks. Von Rheinbaben and Ruckes (2004) determine the 
optimal number of creditors that balances the costs of information disclosure against the costs 
of higher interest rates due to the banks’s monopoly power. Accordingly, the relationship 
between the innovativeness of a firm and the number of its lenders would be negative (Yosha, 
1995) or U-shaped (Von Rheinbaben/Ruckes, 2004). 
 
The above arguments yield hypotheses about the influence of firm-specific variables on the 
number of bank relationships. The main prediction can be broadly formulated as follows: 
H1: The number of banking relationships decreases with the riskiness and information 
opaqueness of the firm and its loans. 
The arguments about benefits of single bank relationships hold for the case that the borrower 
needs a one-shot finance. Models of repeated lending show that an inside bank may use its 
superior information to hold-up borrowers since outside investors face a winner’s curse and 
would be reluctant to extend loans to the firm (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992). When 
commitment contracts cannot be written, firms have an incentive to develop multiple banking 
relationships to save hold-up costs arising from this lock-in in future loan contracts (Jean-
Baptiste, 2005). Elsas et al. (2004) show that the co-existence of a relationship bank and 
arm’s length financiers may optimally balance the hold-up cost of relationship banking and 
the coordination failure of multiple creditors for risky firms or for firms with low expected 
  5   cash-flow. The implication is that firms should maintain, at most, only a few bank 
relationships (‘one-to-few’ hypothesis). Since the lock-in increases with the duration of the 
relationship, we expect that firms hold the more banking relationships the longer the 
relationship to their housebank is. Combined with the above discussed benefits of exclusive 
housebank relationships, our hypotheses concerning the role of the intensity of the bank 
relationship can be summarized as follows: 
H2: The number of banking relationships decreases with the importance of the housebank 
relationship, and increases with its duration.  
While informationally opaque firms thus seem to benefit from a low number of banking 
relationships, other firms may need multiple banking relationships because a single bank 
cannot provide all their financing needs. This restriction of credit availability may be expected 
to occur when the firm is large, complex, and geographically dispersed, while its housebank is 
too small to diversify the firm’s risk, has not sufficient expertise to satisfy its demand or does 
not have offices in all the localities where the firm needs services (Berger et al. 2005, p. 8). 
Multiple banking relationships may also be motivated by a risk sharing or cross selling by the 
bank (Cosci/Meliciani 2002, p. 39). Carletti et al. (2004) explain why banks may prefer to 
share lending particularly to SMEs even if this implies free-riding and duplication of 
monitoring efforts. They predict a greater use of multiple-bank lending when banks are small 
relative to investment projects, firms are less profitable and monitoring costs are high. Thus, 
we hypothesize 
H3: The number of banking relationships increases with the firm’s loan demand and 
restrictions in credit availability. 
Detragiache et al. (2000) show that multiple banking relationships are advantageous even for 
small and young firms, if banks are subject to exogenous shocks that may cause premature 
termination of the relationships with their customers. Such shocks may result from liquidity 
problems due to withdrawals of bank deposits, bank failures in a fragile environment, but also 
regulatory changes that cause portfolio restructurings of banks. If a firm must fear that its 
relationship bank is hit by a shock and that adverse selection will prevent refinancing from 
uninformed banks, it should choose multiple banking relationships as an insurance against 
future credit rationing. Thus, we expect 
H4: The number of banking relationships increases with the likelihood of future credit 
restrictions at the housebank. 
  6   The number of bank relationships may be affected by further supply-side variables of the 
banking market. Small banks in the local banking market have an advantage in gathering and 
verifying soft information about small and risky borrowers, compared to large banks.
6 Jean-
Baptiste (2005) predicts that firms that borrow from small banks have less incentives to 
develop multiple banking relationships, since bank size may serve as a commitment device 
that prevents the bank from holding up borrowers in the future. Thus, we expect 
H5: The number of banking relationships is lower if the borrower’s housebank is a small, 
local bank. 
Consolidation of banks and technological change tend to reduce the importance of exclusive 
housebank relationships. Large banks are likely to reduce their small business lending after 
consolidation, because small, local banks have a comparative advantage in providing 
relationship lending services (Berger/Udell, 2003).
7 Since technological change has eased the 
ability to lend to small firms at a distance (Petersen/Rajan, 2002), out-of-market lending to 
small firms in local markets increased substantially in recent years (Hannan, 2003). If, 
however, distance between borrower and lender still matters for the provision of relationship 
banking services to SMEs, the availability of banks that will serve these customers is the 
lower the higher is the local banking market concentration. Thus, we expect 
H6: The number of banking relationships decreases with local banking market 
concentration. 
 
2.2 Empirical Evidence 
In the empirical literature on relationship lending, the number of bank relationships has been 
often treated as an exogenous variable to test the influence of a close bank-borrower 
relationship on credit availability and the terms of lending.
8 Studies about the impact of the 
banking arrangement on firm performance have recently begun to look at the two-way 
correspondance between the number of banking relationships and firm profitability, 
examining the determinants of both variables (Degryse/Ongena 2001, Fok et al. 2004). The 
                                                 
6   For empirical evidence see Carter et al. (2004). 
7   Evidence of a specialization of small banks on small business lending has been provided among others by 
Akhavein et al. (2004), Berger et al. (2001), Jayaratne/Wolken (1999) and  Strahan/Weston (1998). For an 
overview of the empirical literature on this and on consolidation effects see Akhavein et al. (2004) and Carter et 
al. (2004). 
8   See Petersen/Rajan (1994), Cole (1998), Harhoff/Körting (1998a), Machauer/Weber (1998), Ongena/Smith 
(2000a), Elsas/Krahnen (2002), Shin/Kolari (2004). 
  7   first studies that regressed the number of bank relationships on a broader set of independent 
variables have been undertaken by Ongena and Smith (2000b) for a cross section of 20 
European countries, by Detragiache et al. (2000) for SMEs in Italy and by Harhoff/Körting 
(1998b) and Machauer/Weber (2000) for SMEs in Germany. They have induced recent 
studies for the U.S. (Guiso/Minetti 2004), Italy (Cosci/Meliciani 2002), France (Ziane 2003), 
Argentina (Berger et al. 2001), Taiwan (Yu/Hsieh 2003, Fok et al. 2004), India (Berger et al. 
2005), Japan (Ogawa et al. 2005) and a cross section of 60 countries (Qian/Strahan 2005). 
 
The descriptive statistics of the various data sets show that small firms tend to maintain fewer 
banking relationships than large firms. However, there is a large variation in the average 
number of bank relationships which cannot only be explained by the size of firms within a 
country, but also by differences in legal protection of creditors and the enforcement of 
contracts (Qian/Strahan 2005, Ongena/Smith 2000a).
9 In line with the ‘one-to-few’ 
hypothesis, SMEs in Germany (Harhoff/Körting, 1998a, 1998b, Hommel/Schneider, 2003), 
the US (Petersen/Rajan, 1994, Berger/Udell 1995), Norway (Ongena/Smith, 2001) and France 
(Ziane 2003) hold on average less than three bank relationships. This is not the case for SMEs 
in Italy (Detragiache et al., 2000, Guiso 2003, Cosci/Melisciani 2004) and for medium and 
larger firms in most countries.
10 
 
An overview of the results of comparable regressions which seek to explain the number of 
bank relationships in single countries is given in table 1. 
 
                                                 
9   While firms in the U.K., Norway and Sweden maintain fewer than three bank relationships on average, 
firms in Italy, Portugal, Belgium and Spain maintain on average ten or more bank relationships (Ongena/Smith 
2000a). 
10   For an overview see Ongena/Smith (2000a, pp.243). Medium and larger firms typically hold more than three 
bank relationships in Germany (Elsas/Krahnen 1998, Machauer/Weber 2000), Argentina (Berger et al. 2001), 
Taiwan (Yu/Hsieh 2003, Fok et al. 2004), India (Berger et al. 2005) and the majority of 20 European countries 
(Ongena/Smith, 2000b). 
  8   Table 1: Determinants of the number of bank relationships: previous evidence 
Dependent variable: number of banking relationships or probability of multiple banking relationships 
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s i z e              
total assets (or loans)  +
 ***              +          +
*** +
***  *** +
***
number of employees    +




age   +
 ***             +
*** +
*** -
***  n. sig.    n. sig.  n. sig.  n. sig. 
credit risk/ fin. distress  n. sig.      + 
**             n. sig.
innovation                 +
*




** n. sig. +
***  ** 
delinquencies                   +
*** n. sig. 
credit  rationing                   +
**
Relationship characteristics             




housebank                  -
***
ownership share  + 
*            
Banking market 
characteristics 
           
bank size    -
 *          +        +
***  ***
bank type                     n.  sig./-




bank fragility    +
 **          +       
 ***
market  concentration                  n.sig. n. sig.
*: significant at the 10% level;  
**: significant at the 5% level;  
***: significant at the 1% level;  
n. sig.: tested, but not significant 
 
  9    A unanimous finding is that the number of banking relationships increases with firm size and 
age.
11 This supports hypothesis H1, presuming that credit risk and information opacity are 
lower for larger and older firms. Inconsistent with H1, however, several risk proxies (financial 
distress, delinquencies, leverage, innovative activity) exert a positive influence on the number 
of banking relationships. 
 
The positive influence of firm size on the number of banking relationship is also consistent 
with H3, assuming that larger firms need larger loans or a wider range of bank services than 
smaller ones. Leverage always exerts a positive influence on the number of bank 
relationships. This also supports H3, given that high leverage is a proxy for high loan demand 
or high credit risk which causes credit rationing at a single bank. However, the impact of loan 
demand and credit rationing according to H3 has not been directly tested so far. The previous 
studies neither include the loan volume nor a measure for credit availability as independent 
variables. The only exception is Ziane (2003), who found that credit rationing (as perceived 
by financial managers) had a significant positive influence on the number of bank 
relationships held by small firms in France.  
 
The evidence about the influence of characteristics of the bank-borrower relationship is also 
mixed. For medium-sized firms in Germany, where the housebank relationship traditionally 
plays a large role, the significant effects of the relationship duration and the importance of a 
housebank (Machauer/Weber 2000) are consistent with H2. Recent studies for the US 
(Guiso/Minetti 2004) and France (Ziane 2003) find reverse effects of comparable variables 
(see table 1). However, using duration analysis, Farinha and Santos (2002) find for young 
firms in Portugal that the chance of substituting a single banking relationships with multiple 
banking relationships increases with the duration of that relationship. Ongena and Smith 
(2001) show for Norwegian firms that the probability of ending a bank relationship increases 
in duration and that small, young and highly leveraged firms maintain the shortest 
relationships. 
 
To test the influence of expected restrictions of credit availability due to liquidity shocks 
(H4), several measures of the characteristics of the lending bank have been used (variables 
‘bank type’ and ‘bank fragility’ in table 1). Evidence consistent with H4 has been found for 
                                                 
11    See also Petersen/Rajan (1994), Harhoff/Körting (1998a), Farinha/Santos (2002) and Ongena/Smith 
(2000b). 
  10   the emerging economies of Taiwan and India as well as for Italy and Argentina. Yu/Hsieh 
(2003) observe for Taiwan that government owned banks are viewed as the safest source of 
credit and hence, firms with single banking relationships will borrow from them first. Berger 
et al. (2005, p. 24) find for India that firms with state-owned banks and financially safe banks 
as their main bank have less need for additional bank relationships. For Italy (Detragiache et 
al. 2000) and Argentina (Berger et al. 2001), bank fragility (measured in terms of the bank’s 
size, volatility of liquidity, nonperforming loans, leverage or profitability) has a positive 
impact on the likelihood to borrow from multiple banks. However, the cross-country study of 
Ongena and Smith (2000b) finds mixed support for H4. On the one hand, the number of 
banking relationships tends to be higher in countries with inefficient judicial systems and poor 
enforcement of property rights, on the other hand, it tends to be higher in countries with 
higher banking stability (measured by bank credit ratings). 
 
Evidence consistent with the bank size hypothesis H5 has been found by Harhoff/Körting 
(1998b) and Berger et al. (2001). The country studies reported in table 1 find no significant 
influence of local banking market concentration on the number of banking relationship. 
However, the cross-country study of Ongena and Smith (2000b) shows that firms maintain a 
higher number of banking relationships in countries with lower banking market concentration. 
This is consistent with H6. 
 
All previous studies refer to small, medium and large firms (see table 1), with the exception of 
that of Harhoff and Körting (1998b) who examine also microenterprises (with a median 
number of employees equal to 10). None of the previous studies investigates the financing of 
professionals as microenterprises. Due to their small size and high information opaqueness, 
we expect that they are especially prone to credit rationing and hold only one to few bank 
relationships. 
 
  11   3. Data and Measurements 
Data is obtained from an online survey among 6,000 professionals in Germany, which was 
carried out in spring 2002. The addresses of the interviewees were randomly chosen from the 
yellow pages and from publicly available registers of chambers and industries. The 
interviewees  were allocated to the industries proportionally to the actual industry structure of 
professionals in Germany. 230 professionals answered the questionnaire, implying a response 
rate of 3.8%.
12 37% of the respondents belong to the medicative sector, 34% are business 
consultants, 25% are natural scientists and 4% belong to the cultural sector. This structure 
represents the actual industry structure of professionals in Germany well. 88% of the 
professionals in our sample are microenterprises with less than 10 employees. Nearly half of 
them have even not more than 3 employees. For 84% of the sample the turnover does not 
exceed EUR 500,000 and for 98% it does not exceed EUR 2.5 million. Data was collected 
about bank relationships, firm characteristics, characteristics of the banks with which 
relationships are held, the loans granted, features of the banking market and information 
gathering by banks. The definition, measurements and main descriptive statistics of the 
variables are summarized in table 2.  
 
 
                                                 
12   The low response rate is likely to be due to the fact that the questionnaire contained some very personal 
questions and questions about financial matters, which are reluctantly answered online. In Germany, there is still 
much concern about the safety of the internet, and especially older persons are reluctant to use this medium. In 
our sample, the mean age of the self-employed persons acting as professionals is 49 years. 
  12   Table 2: Definition, measurements and descriptive statistics of variables 
Dependent  Variable    Mean    Median
num_bank  number of bank relationships     
  
2.27 2.00
Firm characteristics   
size  number of employees  6.45   
   
  
   
   
   
     
   
  
4.00
age  age of the firm in years  16.73 12.00
industry  Set of dummies with value 1, if the professional firm belongs to (1) the medicative sector, (2) 
the business consultant sector, (3) the natural scientist sector or (4) the cultural sector, 
otherwise 0 
  Medicative  0.36 0.00
  Cultural  0.07 0.00
  Natural Scientist  0.24  0.00 
  Business consultant  0.33  0.00 
finance_bank   Dummy indicating whether the firm is dependent on bank finance   0.56 0.00
innovation Qualitative variable indicating the research and development effort (R&D) of the 
professional, ranging from 1 (= high R&D) to 5 (= low R&D). 
2.24 2.00
no financial distress  Dummy indicating that the firm is not in financial distress  0.46 0.00
Relationship characteristics   
duration  Duration of the housebank relationship in years  16.99  15.00 
housebank  Qualitative variable, indicating the importance of the housebank perceived by the firm, 
ranging from 1 (= very important) to 5 (= very unimportant) 
1.69   
  
1.00
Bank characteristics   
rating_hb  Qualitative variable, indicating the rating of the housebank (Moody´s), ranging from 1 (= A+; 
best rating) to 15 (= E-; worst rating). 
7.74   
  
   
   
7.00
bank_type  Set of dummies, indicating whether the housebank is (1) a private bank, (2) a cooperative 
bank or (3) a savings bank 
  private bank  0.39 0.00
  cooperative bank  0.28 0.00
  13    Loan characteristics      
maturity  Maturity of the loan in years  9.73  10.00 
credit volume  Set of dummies indicating whether the volume of the loan is (1) up to EUR 10,000, (2) EUR 
10,000 to 50,000, (3) EUR 50,000 to 100,000, (4) EUR 100,000 to 250,000, (5) EUR 
250,000 to 500,000 and (6) more than EUR 500,000 
  
  
  Up to EUR 10,000  0.04  0.00 
  EUR 10,000 to 50,000  0.21  0.00 
  EUR 50,000 to 100,000  0.25  0.00 
  EUR 100,000 to 250,000  0.23  0.00 
  EUR 250,000 to 500,000  0.21  0.00 
investment credit  Dummy indicating whether the firm has an investment credit  0.44  0.00 
Market structure and 
regulation 
 
Basle II   Dummy indicating whether the professional is informed about the new Basle II regulation  0.43  0.00 
banks_vicinity  number of banks not more than 5 kilometres afar from the firm  5.13  4.00 
distance_housebank  distance between firm and housebank in kilometres  13.44  2.00 
Control variables      
credit availability   Dummy indicating whether the professional expects an increase in credit availability from 
multiple bank relationships  
0.55    1.00
visit  Dummy indicating whether the bank visits the professional  0.04  0.00 
monitoring  Dummy indicating whether the bank monitors the professional’s monetary transactions  0.11  0.00 
  14    The variables of this study resemble standard variables from the literature on relationship 
lending. Our dependent variable is the number of bank relationships held. In the present 
sample its average is 2.27. This is consistent with the one-to-few hypothesis and similar to 




As independent variables we first use the common firm-specific measures of credit risk. It is 
generally assumed that credit risk is negatively related to firm size and age, but positively 
related to innovative activity, the incidence of financial distress and industry risk. As a further 
risk proxy, we include the variable finance_bank, which indicates whether the firm is 
dependent on being financed by the bank. We presume that a higher bank dependency implies 
a higher credit risk to the lending bank.  
 
Secondly, we include the duration and importance of the housebank relationship to measure 
relationship lending. In the present sample, housebank relationships have an average duration 
of 17 years and are considered as important or very important on average. This confirms our 
expectation that relationship banking plays a larger role for microenterprises than for the 
small and medium-sized firms considered in previous studies, where housebank relationships 
tend to be less important and shorter.
14 
 
Thirdly, as bank-specific variables we consider the housebank’s type and rating. The bank 
type variable indicates to which of the three banking groups in the German banking market 
(private banks, cooperative banks, savings banks) the borrower’s housebank belongs. In 
contrast to the nation-wide operating big private banks, the savings banks and cooperative 
banks are small, local banks. In the present sample, 67% of the professionals have a 
housebank relationship with a savings bank or a cooperative bank and 33% have a housebank 
relationship with a big private bank. This confirms our expectation that small, local banks are 
important for the financing of microenterprises. The housebank’s rating is included to test 
hypothesis H4. We assume that a bad rating involves a higher risk of premature termination of 
the bank-customer relationship.  
 
                                                 
13   Harhoff and Körting (1998) find a mean number of  lending relationships of 1.8 for micro and small firms. 
Hommel and Schneider (2003, p.64) find a mean number of  lending relationships of 1.9 for microenterprises 
with an annual turnover less than EUR 1 million in 2002. 
14   For comparison with the descriptive statistics of other studies, see Menkhoff et al. (2006, table 2). As a fourth variable group, we include loan-specific variables as proxies for credit risk or loan 
demand, thus going beyond previous studies (see table 1). It is expected that credit risk 
increases with the duration and volume of the loan and that it depends on the type of the loan. 
We presume that investment credits imply a higher credit risk than overdrafts and thus go 
along with fewer bank relationships. 
 
Our fifth variable group ‘market structure and regulation’ includes a proxy for the change of 
the regulatory framework implied by the Basle II rules. Especially small firms fear that the 
implementation of the new capital rules of the Basle II accord will cause credit restrictions by 
inducing banks to introduce risk adjusted pricing or to restructure their portfolios away from 
small business finance. Thus, the variable “Basle II” is a further measure for an exogenous 
shock to test H4. Bank market structure is measured by the number of banks in the vicinity of 
the borrowing firm and by the distance to the housebank. Local banking market concentration 
is presumed to be the higher the lower the number of banks in the borrower’s vicinity and the 
longer the distance the borrower must travel to his or her housebank. 
 
As control variables, we include variables measuring efforts to overcome credit constraints. 
The variable ‘credit availability’ indicates whether the professional has chosen multiple bank 
relationships to increase the availability of credits. The variables ‘visit’ and ‘monitoring’ 
measure efforts of information gathering on the side of the bank. 
 
Table 3 summarizes the hypotheses to be tested, the independent variables and the expected 
relationships. 
 
  16  Table 3 : Overview of hypotheses and expected signs 
Dependent variable: number of bank relationships 
Hypothesis   Independent 
variables 
Expected sign  
H1 
The number of banking relationships decreases 
with the riskiness and information opaqueness 
of the firm and its loans. 
size 
age  




duration of loan 
investment credit 











The number of banking relationships decreases 
with the importance of the housebank 








The number of banking relationships increases 
with the firm’s loan demand and restrictions in 
credit availability.  






The number of banking relationships increases 
with the likelihood of future credit restrictions 
at the housebank. 
rating_hb 






The number of banking relationships is lower 
if the borrower’s housebank is a small, local 
bank. 
bank_type  positive/negative 
H6 
The number of banking relationships decreases 






4. Regression Results and Discussion 
The hypotheses are tested by linear OLS estimations. After conducting a White-test,
15 
heteroscedasticity could be excluded for all estimations. The empirical results are reported in 
table 4. The number of bank relationships, the size and the age of the firm are taken in 
logarithmic form. To find out the key determinants of the number of bank relationships, we 
perform six specifications. Sequentially, we include the firm-specific variables (models I and 
II), the duration of the relationship (model III), the housebank variable and bank rating 
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15   See Greene (2000, pp. 508) and Hackl (2004, pp. 174). Table 4: Regression Results (OLS) 
Dependent variable: LN(number of bank relationships) 



























Firm  characteristics      


































































      














Bank  characteristics       






bank_type        
private bank        0.0108 
(0.0737) 
cooperative bank        -0.1223 
(-0.5967) 
Loan  characteristicss       




credit volume        




EUR 10,000 to 
50,000 





EUR 50,000 to 
100,000 






EUR 100,000 to 
250,000 






EUR 250,000 to 
500,000 










Market structure and regulation           
Basle II        0.0971 
(0.9911) 
  18  banks_vicinity         -0.0004 
(-0.0463) 
distance_housebank        0.0013 
(0.5630) 
Control variables        
credit availability        0.2126 
(2.0003)
** 
visit        -0.2459 
(-1.2154) 
monitoring        -0.0140 
(-0.0952) 






























***  Significant at 1% level,  
**  significant at 5% level,  
*  significant at 10% level 
 
Firm size and age show a positive influence on the number of bank relationships, which is 
significant in all, respectively the first four specifications. This supports hypothesis H1 under 
the presumption that small and young firms are riskier and more opaque than larger and older 
firms. Another explanation for the size effect is that, according to H3, larger firms need more 
or larger loans which they may obtain at more competitive terms from several banks. 
Moreover, larger firms may wish to offer a larger number of bank connections as a service to 
their larger customer base. The other firm-specific variables show no significant impact. 
However, the positive influence of the absence of financial distress and the negative influence 
of innovativeness correspond to the prediction of H1. Since professionals belong to the 
services sector with low innovative activity, the insignificant influence of the innovation 
variable is not surprising. 
 
Neither the duration nor the importance of the housebank relationship show a significant 
influence on the number of bank relationships. Thus, we find no support for hypothesis H2. 
Also the influence of the housebank’s type is insignificant. However, professionals whose 
housebank is a private bank hold more bank relationships and those whose housebank is a 
cooperative bank hold fewer bank relationships than those who have a housebank relationship 
with a savings bank. This is in line with hypothesis H5. In Germany, both cooperative banks 
and savings banks are active in geographically restricted local banking markets, and the 
former tend to be smaller than the latter.  
  19  A worse rating of the housebank increases the number of bank relationships, but significantly 
only in model VI. Even if this finding is in line with the prediction of H4, it is unlikely to be 
due to the fear of bank insolvency in the highly stable banking market of Germany. A more 
plausible explanation is that a rating is also a measure for service quality, i.e. professionals 
choose additional bank relationships when their housebank provides low service quality.  
 
The positive coefficient of the loan maturity variable is inconsistent with H1, but 
insignificant. The included loan volume classes all have negative, mostly significant 
regression coefficients relative to the reference class of the largest loans. This implies that 
borrowers with larger loans hold more bank relationships than those with smaller ones. While 
this finding is in contrast to H1, it is in line with H3. It may may also be consistent with the 
hold-up hypothesis. Since larger loans tend to be more costly for the borrower than smaller 
loans due to higher interest rates and collateral claims, they imply higher hold-up costs in the 
case of a lock-in by the relationship bank. Thus, the borrower has a larger incentive to choose 
multiple banking relationships to obtain loans at more competitive terms or increase credit 
availability. Consistent with H1, investment credits go along with fewer bank relationships, 
but the influence is insignificant. 
 
The variables of market structure and regulation do not contribute significantly to the 
explanation of the number of banking relationships. The positive influence of the Basle II 
variable corresponds to the prediction of H4, but we cannot conclude that professionals who 
are informed about the Basle II rules choose significantly more bank relationships to insure 
themselves against a credit rationing after the implementation of these rules. Both measures of 
local banking market concentration do not show the influence on the number of banking 
relationships predicted by H6. Neither the number of banks in the vicinity nor the distance to 
the housebank is relevant for a professional’s decision to hold multiple banking relationships. 
Technological change in telecommunication has increased the ability of SMEs to hold 
relationships with remote banks. Also professionals in Germany use online banking, even still 
to a small extent. However, this does not imply that distance is irrelevant for the provision of 
relationship banking services to microenterprises. 
 
Among the control variables, the credit availability variable shows a significant influence. 
Consistent with H3, professionals choose a higher number of bank relationships to obtain 
more loans. Since our evidence concerning the influence of firm-specific credit risk is 
  20  ambiguous, we cannot determine whether it is the risky borrowers who hold more bank 
relationships to overcome credit rationing. To draw conclusions about the relationship 
between borrower quality and the number of bank relationships, further research is needed 
about the different proxies for credit risk.  
 
To test the robustness of our OLS results, we also estimated a Poisson model, which measures 
the occurrence probability. This method should be applied to count data, if the count variable 
takes on the value zero for a nontrivial fraction of the population (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 645). 
Since this does not apply to the count data in our sample, we preferred the OLS method. 
Moreover, a comparative study of models for analyzing count data showed that the Poisson 
regression yielded more Type I errors than the OLS regression, which is not overly sensitive 
to false positives (Sturman, 1999). The results of the Poisson regression are given in table 5 in 
the appendix. They are qualitatively nearly identical to those of table 4. Only the variables 
firm size and age loose their significance when the variables loan duration and size are 
included in the Poisson regression. The signs of the regression coefficients remain the same. 
 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
The present paper tried to identify determinants of the number of bank relationships held by 
microenterprises. Its aim was to test theoretically derived hypotheses on the optimal number 
of bank relationships and to investigate whether and why bank relationships of 
microenterprises differ from those of larger firms. After a review on the theory, the 
hypotheses and previous empirical evidence, we conducted OLS and Poisson estimations 
using data from a recent survey among professionals in Germany. This is the first attempt to 
investigate the number of bank relationships of this group of enterprises. 
 
Our main results are as follows. First, the firms in our sample hold on average about two 
banking relationships. This corresponds to the information-theoretic one-to-few hypothesis 
and previous evidence for micro and small enterprises. Because these firms tend to be 
characterized by high information opacity, they benefit most from being monitored in a close 
housebank relationship. The unanimous finding of previous studies that the number of bank 
relationships is increasing in firm size and age also holds for our sample.  
 
  21  Secondly, direct proxies for credit risk do not matter significantly. This is contrary to the 
results of a previous study on micro and small firms in Germany (Harhoff/Körting 1998b), 
but corresponds to findings of studies on medium-sized firms (Machauer/Weber 2000, 
Guiso/Minetti 2004). The signs of the regression coefficients indicate that risky firms tend to 
hold fewer banking relationships, consistent with credit rationing theory. 
 
Third, firms tend to hold a larger number of banking relationships if they need more or larger 
loans. This supports the hypothesis that the number of banking relationships is driven by the 
firm’s loan demand and restrictions in credit availability. We expect that this holds 
particularly for micro and small enterprises, which are most prone to credit rationing due to 
their high information opaqueness. However, we cannot compare these results with those for 
larger firms, because the influence of the loan volume and credit availability has not been 
directly tested in previous studies.  
 
Fourth, the number of bank relationships does not depend on the intensity or the duration of 
the housebank relationship. Thus, we do not find support for the hold-up theory, upon which 
the previous evidence is mixed. Miroenterprises do not seem to choose multiple banking 
relationships to obtain cheaper loans, but to obtain more or larger loans, because their credit 
availability is restricted at a single bank.  
 
Fifth, we do not find evidence for a supply-side determination of the number of bank 
relationships. The number of bank relationships held by a professional enterprise does neither 
depend on the type of its housebank, nor on changes in bank regulation, nor on local banking 
market concentration. As an important regulatory change we considered the introduction of 
the Basle II rules, which was expected to increase credit rationing of  SMEs. However, these 
expectations did not induce a higher number of bank relationships in our sample. 
 
In sum, these findings are consistent with credit rationing theory. Because of the scarcity of 
comparable studies for microenterprises, we cannot draw conclusions on whether our results 
are typical for this firm size or whether they are due to the special features of professional 
firms. Also, we still do not know whether the observed number of banking relationships is 
primarily determined by the demand-side or the supply side of the banking market. If the 
supply side does not matter, we do not need to be concerned about detrimental effects of bank 
consolidations on the financing of small firms. To find this out is a task for future research.
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Table 5: Regression results (Poisson) 
Dependent variable: number of bank relationships 
























Firm characteristics      
























































      














Bank characteristics       






bank_type        
private bank        -0.0674 
(-0.3077) 
cooperative bank        -0.2184 
(-0.6933) 
Loan  characteristics       




credit volume        




EUR 10,000 to 
50,000 




EUR 50,000 to 
100,000 




EUR 100,000 to 
250,000 




EUR 250,000 to 
500,000 




investment credit        -0.0298 
(-0.1802) 
  28  Market structure and regulation       
Basle II        0.1115 
(0.7407) 
banks_vicinity         -0.0021 
(-0.1585) 
distance_housebank        0.0020 
(0.5320) 
Control variables        
credit availability        0.2648 
(1.5856)* 
visit        -0.3029 
(-0.9599) 
monitoring        -0.0486 
(-0.2054) 
















***  Significance at 1% level,  
**  significance at 5% level,  
*  significance at 10% level 
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